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Molinari: In Re Smiley

IN RE SMILEY
LAw-Due Process Right to Counsel-Indigents
do not have the right to appointed counsel in matrimonial
actions. 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (19.75).
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.'
CONSTITUTIONAL

Must an indigent in a matrimonial action be provided with
counsel in order to have an effective opportunity to be heard as
required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment?
The New York State Court of Appeals, in In re Smiley,2 has
answered in the negative. This decision will operate to dramatically limit the opportunities of poor people to participate meaningfully in civil litigation.
The appellants in this case, Rhoda Smiley and Betty Monroe, were originally represented by Cornell Legal Aid. Legal Aid,
however, moved for permission to withdraw as counsel because of
conflicts of interest.3 The trial court permitted the appellants to
proceed as poor persons under section 1102(a) of the New York
Civil Procedure Law and Rules, 4 appointed legal counsel, and
directed that counsel be paid by the county. Upon an appeal
brought by the county, the appellate division reversed, and held
that although the appellees had an absolute right to counsel, the
trial court was without authority to require the county to provide
compensation.5 In reviewing this case, the court of appeals thus
had to resolve two distinct, but related issues. First, is there a
constitutional right to counsel in a matrimonial action? Second,
if there is such a right, does a court have the power to direct that
money be paid from the public treasury to assure such representation?
Criminal defendants charged with conduct which might lead
to a jail sentence have a judicially recognized right to counsel.6
This right arises long before trial7 and continues through to parole
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
2. 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
3. In addition to the appellants, Cornell Legal Aid represented parties who were
either co-respondents or major witnesses in the action. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 446,
330 N.E.2d 53, 61, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 98 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
4. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1102(a) (McKinney 1963).
5. In re Smiley, 45 App. Div. 2d 785, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1974).
6. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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revocation hearings.' Although a civil litigant often stands to lose
as much or more than a criminal defendant, the right to counsel
has historically been found to be inapplicable where the court
action did not contemplate the imposition of criminal sanctions.9
An indigent might have been required to appear before a tribunal
which would resolve disputes concerning his or her basic rights
relating to homeland,' 0 the custody of a child," or the disposition
of property'2 without the advice of one trained in the craft of
safeguarding such rights-an attorney.
Apparent in recent cases, however, is a growing concern for
the indigent's right to counsel in quasi-criminal and civil proceedings.'3 Certain jurisdictions have declared that indigents have a
right to appointed counsel in both civil contempt'4 and civil commitment' 5 proceedings. Other courts have held that parents have
a right to counsel in custody," dependency," and neglect"8 hearings. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in a series of
decisons that parallel the genesis of the right to counsel in criminal cases,' 9 has given every indication that a constitutional man8. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
9. See generally Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE
L.J. 545 (1967); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322
(1966).
10. See, e.g., Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F.2d
80, 82 (8th Cir. 1924). For a good discussion of the right to counsel at various stages of
deportation proceedings, see Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings,45
MINN. L. REV. 875 (1961).
11. See, e.g., People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
12. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966).
13. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (the right to counsel is applicable to
juvenile delinquency hearings notwithstanding the fact that such proceedings are nominally civil in nature).
14. United States v. Sun Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972); Otton v. Zaborac,
525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974).
15. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order reissued,
379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974); People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217
N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966); People v. Collman, 9 Ore. App. 476, 497 P.2d 1233
(1972).
16. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974).
17. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
18. People v. Brown, 49 Mich. App. 358, 212 N.W.2d 55 (1973); Friensz v. Caha, 190
Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973); In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968).
19. In the criminal area, the Supreme Court first ruled that an indigent could not be
denied the right to be effectively heard, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); and
subsequently held that court fees could not be used to block access to the courts, Griffin
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date to provide counsel to indigents in matrimonial actions is not
long in coming.
In Boddie v. Connecticut 0 the Supreme Court declared that
if a state is to fulfill the promise of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, it must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 21 Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan reasoned that because of the basic position of marriage in our society, and because the state exercises a monopoly
over the means of terminating this relationship, "due process
prohibit[s] a state from denying access to its courts by individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriage because of inability to pay. '22 Thus, a Connecticut statute requiring payment
of filing fees and costs without regard for the litigant's financial
ability to make such payments, was held to be unconstitutional
because it effectively precluded indigents from being able to obtain a divorce.?
The Supreme Court has also stated that once in court, due
process would be denied if a civil litigant were refused the right
to be heard entirely,? or denied the right to employ his or her own
counsel.25 In the context of criminal cases, the Court has held that
the right to be meaningfully heard includes the right to appear
by counsel. 2 That a layman's lack of skill is no less damaging to
his chances to be effectively heard in a civil action than in a
criminal action has also been recognized by the Court. 27
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The next step was the recognition of a constitutional right
to appointed counsel in criminal cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
21. Id. at 377.
22. Id. at 374.
23. Id. at 382.
24. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
25. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (dictum) the Court noted:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse
to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably
may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and,
therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.
26. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
27. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,
7 (1964). The Court stated that "[1laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect
their rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counselled adversaries. .. "
For the arguments of two commentators that the average uncounselled indigent is at
a greater disadvantage in a civil than in a criminal case see Botein, Appointed Counsel
for the Indigent Civil Defendant: A ConstitutionalRight Without a Judicial Remedy?, 36

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 6

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1975]

In Deason v. Deason,5 the New York Court of Appeals relied
upon the Boddie rationale to conclude that poor persons can not
be required to pay the costs generated by the service of notice by
publication. Following the spirit of the Deason decision, many
lower New York courts have held that indigents have a constitutional right to assigned counsel in matrimonial litigation. 9
Despite such strong precedents, the Smiley court chose to
distinguish between the right to counsel of a criminal defendant
and that of a matrimonial litigant. The court acknowledged that
in state prosecutions involving a potential loss of liberty, the
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process of law require
the appointment of a lawyer if the person so jeopardized is unable
to provide one for him or herself.30 The court stated, however, that
no similiar right applied in civil litigation.3 1 Boddie and Deason
were distinguished on the ground that they each involved payment of court fees which denied the party access to the legal
system." According to the court, the constitutional infirmity involved in Boddie and Deason was that the court fees precluded
33
indigents from initially asserting their claims in a court of law.
While conceding that in certain types of matrimonial litigation,
counsel would be essential to the full exercise of one's rights, 34 the
court maintained that the assistance of a lawyer could not be
interpreted as a legal precondition for access to the judicial system. 5
The distinction between access to the legal system and the
right to have counsel once in court as a means of defining the
parameters of due process has been strongly criticized by both
courts3" and commentators.3 The gravamen of this criticism is, as
BROOKLYN L. REv. 368, 370 (1970); Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1967).

28. 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973).
29. In re Smiley, 45 App. Div. 2d 785, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1974); Jacox v.
Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2d Dep't 1973); Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc.
2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973); Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1973).
30. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 437, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (1975).
31. Id. at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
32. Id. at 440, 330 N.E.2d at 56-57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
33. Id. at 440, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence
County 1973); Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1973), rev'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1974).
37. Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545
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Judge Jones suggested in his dissenting opinion in Smiley, that
access to the judicial system should not be narrowly construed as
merely liberty to approach. It should instead be interpreted more
broadly so as to encompass the right to an effective presence and
participation in the legal process.18 As one lower New York court
has observed:39
Access must be viewed in the context of due process. In
criminal matters defendants do not have access insuring due
process unless represented by counsel. (Citation omitted.) So,
too, in civil matters, access that denies due process does not
meet constitutional standards.
Indigent matrimonial defendants denied equal protection
of the law do not have access to the courts simply because they
are brought in by plaintiff. Access that denies equal protection
is not the access contemplated by due process. Presence is distinguished from access-the two are not equatable. Presence
without equal protection of the law remains only presence; it
does not ripen into access. (Emphasis in original.)
A disturbing consequence of this court of appeals decision is
that it will operate to prevent a large number of New York residents from enforcing a fundamental right 0 in an area in which
they are totally at the mercy of the state." The result in Smiley
(1967); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966).
38. 36 N.Y.2d 433, 443, 330 N.E.2d 53, 59, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 96 (1975) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
39. Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 74 Misc. 2d 122, 124-25, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575-76
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1973).
40. That marriage involves fundamental rights has already been established by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
See also Goodpaster, The Integrationof Equal Protection,Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV. 223, 232 (1970),
where it is noted:
Yet, at least in theory, few changes of legal status are as important as a change
in marital status. The poor person's ability to contract and deny responsibility
for contracts, to remarry, to regularize extra-marital relationships, to clarify the
status of children and intestate inheritance rights, and generally to be free of
the many strong twisted tentacles of a dead marriage are all deeply affected by
marital status. In this sense, the right to have a legal imprimatur on changes in
marital relationship is an extremely important right.
41. State statutes dictate who may marry; by whom the marriage may be
performed; the obligations of the parties during marriage; the grounds for
separation or divorce and the obligations of the parties after the termination of
the marriage. For all purposes the State is very much a "partner" to a marriage
and a "party" in a matrimonial action.
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 82 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1972).
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is due, in part, to the fear of the court that the recognition of a
right to counsel in divorce proceedings would logically necessitate
the recognition of the right for indigents in all civil suits. 2 The
United States Supreme Court has, however, already distinguished between the state's role in matrimonial actions and other
types of civil litigation:43
Without a prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may freely
enter into and rescind commercial contracts, for example, but
we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may
covenant for or dissolve miarriages without state approval. Even
where all substantive requirements are concededly met, we
know of no instances where two consenting adults may divorce
and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal
obligations that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the
prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the State's
judicial machinery.
Thus, the involvement of the state in matrimonial actions is
much more substantial than that in most other types of civil
litigation. This distinction could have been used by the Smiley
majority to distinguish the right to counsel in divorce actions
42. 36 N.Y.2d 433, 440-41, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57-58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93-94 (1975).
43. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971). Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions construing Boddie support the view that litigation involving the marital relation
is easily distinguishable from that involving other civil actions. In United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1972), the Court upheld a statutory provision requiring the payment of filing
fees as a precondition to the consideration of a petition seeking a discharge in bankruptcy.
The Court based its decision on the fact that access to judicial relief was not the only
conceivable remedy available-a debtor is free to enter into a private agreement with his
or her creditors to discharge the obligations. The Court distinguished Boddie, noting that
bankruptcy, unlike marriage, is not a privilege safeguarded by the Constitution.
In Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1972) (per curiam), the Court rejected the
assertion that a state statute requiring the payment of a $25 filing fee in order to obtain
judicial review of certain administrative actions denied poor persons due process of law
under the rationale of Boddie. The Court again noted that its decision in Boddie was
predicated upon the fact that the marital relationship involves the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.
The refusal of the Court to extend the rationale of Boddie to cases involving issues of
less constitutional significance than the marital relationship would have provided strong
precedent for limiting the consequences of a contrary result than was reached in Smiley.
As noted by a lower New York court:
[A]n action for divorce is fundamentally different from actions in contract or
concerning real property. The latter may be brought or not brought; they may
be settled out of court. But our State Constitution (art. I, § 91 [sic § 9])
mandates that divorces may be granted only by "due judicial proceedings."
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 82 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1972).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss1/6

6

Molinari: In Re Smiley

Indigents' Right to Counsel
from that in other types of civil litigation. The court of appeals,
instead, chose to rely upon its tenuous legal concept of access
because of its fear that a contrary result would inevitably lead to
a right to free legal assistance in all areas of civil litigation. The
majority reasoned that such a state of affairs would overburden
both the private bar and the public treasury.44
Having initially determined that there was no constitutional
right to counsel in divorce proceedings,4 5 the court opined that in
the absence of enabling legislation, the judiciary lacked authority
to direct that compensation be paid out of the public treasury; 6
the decision to make expenditures for this purpose was deemed
to be one to be made only by the legislature.47 The court, however,
neglected to consider other resources which might have been
available had it decided that counsel should be provided. 8 The
Smiley majority did not feel compelled to explore these alterna44. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 440-41, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57-58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 9394 (1975). The Smiley court suggested that the burden placed on the private bar by
assignments under C.P.L.R. § 1102(a) might constitute a violation of the constitutional
rights of lawyers. Only four jurisdictions have adopted this minority viewpoint. Instead,
the majority of courts have held that these appointments pass constitutional muster either
because no taking has occurred (defense of paupers is traditionally a service performed
by the bar), or because the bar is merely doing a service owed to the public. See Menin v.
Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 289, 355 N.Y.S.2d 721, 726 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974);
Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prisoners on Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 67778, 466 P.2d 485, 495-96 (1970); See also Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 819 (1968).
Of the four minority jurisdictions only Missouri, State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo.
1971), and Kentucky, Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. Ky. 1972), have held
that appointment of uncompensated counsel violates the federal constitution. Indiana
requires compensation of assigned counsel only because of a state constitutional provision,
Webb Auditor, & Co. v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1853). Utah courts have taken the position that
mandatory service without compensation violates the federal constitution only in civil
cases, Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).
New York case law, contrary to the view suggested by the court in Smiley, supports
the position that a court may constitutionally appoint uncompensated counsel. People v.
Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310, 313, 217 N.E.2d 664, 666, 270 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (1966); People
v. Wittenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 396-97, 207 N.E.2d 358, 360-61, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413, 416-17
(1965); In re Sullivan, 297 N.Y. 190, 195-96, 78 N.E.2d 467, 469-70 (1948). Counsel must
serve whenever his or her previously arranged professional engagements will permit. People v. Thompson, 205 App. Div. 581, 582, 199 N.Y.S. 868, 869 (2d Dep't 1923).
The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-2, (1975) states, inter alia,that
"[elvery lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should
find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged" because it is an obligation of the
profession.
45. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 438, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (1975).
46. Id. at 439, 330 N.E.2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 441, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 93-94. See also text accompanying
n.60 infra.
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tive measures because of its assumption that, as a practical
matter, the representation of indigents has been effectively
accomplished through discretionary court assignment of uncompensated counsel and by the efforts of legal aid societies. 9
The majority is, of course, correct that a discussion of available
means to provide the poor with counsel in civil cases would be
purely academic if existing institutions did, in fact, fulfill the
legal needs of the poor." However, available evidence suggests
51
that they do not.
The usefulness of legal aid organizations was greatly exaggerated by the Smiley court. Publicly financed legal aid apparently
works well in other countries, 52 but in the United States, a lack
49. Id. at 439, 330 N.E.2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The Smiley court had already
decided that no right to appointed counsel in civil cases could be gleaned from either the
sixth amendment or the due process clause when it added its remarks about the sufficiency of legal services for the poor. Though merely dictum in the majority opinion, the
issue of the adequacy of existing legal aid was critical to Judge Fuchsberg's dissenting
analysis of the role of due process in the context of an indigent's right to counsel in civil
cases. He agreed with fellow dissenter, Judge Jones, that the appellants in the instant case
had a due process right to counsel. However, Judge Fuchsberg did not argue that this right
to appointed counsel encompasses all matrimonial litigants. Whether due process mandates free legal assistance should, according to Judge Fuchsberg, be determined on a caseby-case basis. The question to be asked by the trial court is whether appointed counsel is
necessary to provide appellants with meaningful access to the courts. If so, the constitutional privilege arises.
Judge Fuchsberg agreed with the majority in its suggestion that matrimonial actions
and other civil suits are, as far as the rights of indigents are concerned, generally indistinguishable. However, he could not agree with the majority's conclusion that such a premise
precludes the recognition of a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in matrimonial cases; instead, Judge Fuchsberg concluded that the right must also extend to other
areas of civil litigation where fundamental interests are at stake.
Although Judge Fuchberg's reasoning has merit, as a practical matter, trial judges
would inevitably be overburdened by having to decide whether due process requires a
lawyer in a particular case. The judicial time wasted in these types of decisions will
outweigh the relatively slight burden imposed on lawyers. If the case is simple enough that
it can be handled without a lawyer, the small amount of time spent by a lawyer will be
outweighed by the time wasted at both the trial and appellate levels in deciding the due
process claim.
50. See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation,66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1323
(19G6).
51. See Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 381 (1965); Wice & Suwak, CurrentRealities of Public Defender Programs:A National Survey and Analysis, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 161 (1974); Note, The Right to Counsel in
Civil Litigation,supra note 50.
The utter ineptitude of indigent plaintiffs who proceed without counsel has also been
documented. See Schmertz, The Indigent Civil Plaintiffin the Districtof Columbia:Facts
and Commentary, 27 FED. B.J. 235, 243 (1967).
52. Dworkin, The Progress and Future of Legal Aid in Civil Litigation, 28 MOD. L.
REv. 432 (1965); Schweinburg, Legal Assistance Abroad, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 270 (1950);
Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371 (1966).
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of adequate funding has minimized the success of the efforts by
such programs to make the legal system accessible to the indigent.5 3 It has been estimated that only a small portion of those
who need legal help in other than criminal matters ever reach out
for it. " The small number who actually do seek assistance put
such a tremendous strain on the system that its overall effectiveness can be seriously questioned. 5 Matrimonial actions, in particular, are very often put on the bottom of the list of priorities.
Many legal aid organizations do not even accept such cases.5
The issue of whether indigents57 have a constitutional right
to counsel in a matrimonial action is not an academic question
for the many indigents living in New York. In denying this right
by resort to a meaningless distinction between legal access and
effective participation, the Smiley court has neglected the plight
of those who are by virtue of their poverty, effectively locked into
a marriage. A wealthier person seeking release from an unsuccessful marriage need only hire an attorney. Thus, any just solution
must take into account not only the economic realities which
concerned the Smiley court, 59 but also basic fairness to the litigant.
Declaring a right to counsel for indigents in matrimonial
actions need not open the floodgates for the same right in all other
types of civil litigation. That marriage and divorce are fundamental rights of all Americans, and that the state exercises an effec53. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representationand Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
381, 408-11 (1965); Wice & Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs:A
National Survey and Analysis, 10 Calm. L. BULL. 161, 182-83 (1974); Comment, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 546 (1967); Note, The Right
to Counsel in Civil Litigation, supra note 50.
54. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representationand ClassJustice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
381, 408-17 (1965).
55. See note 53, supra.
56. Carlin & Howard, supra note 53, at 413-15.
57. What constitutes indigency is a broad question and out of the scope of this note.
For a general discussion of this topic see Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1108 (1973); Note,
Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public Defender and
Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522, 545-48 (1961).
58. Perhaps because of moralistic attitudes to marriage, indifference to the
circumstances of the poor, and the general neglect that faces unorganized interests in the United States, the law has made divorces too expensive for the poor
to obtain, while effectively permitting them for the affluent.
Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection,Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. Rev. 223, 232 (1971).
59. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 440-41, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57-58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 9394 (1975).
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tive monopoly over the means of exercising these rights, are two
factors that can provide the rationale for limiting this constitutional mandate.
The court's fear of usurping legislative power by ordering the
state or county to pay counsel fees, however, is well-founded."
Initially, to meet this constitutional burden, the court could rely
on its power to appoint non-compensated counsel by mandating
that it would be an abuse of discretion under section 1102(a) of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules for judges not to appoint a
lawyer to represent indigents in a matrimonial action.6 ' Hopefully, legislative enactments-as in the criminal field-would
closely follow." In the absence of such legislative or judicial action, however, the amount of money a person has will indeed
continue to determine the kind of justice that he or she will be
afforded.
John F. Molinari
60. It should be noted that the legislatures around the country have done little to
solve the financial aspects of the problem of the indigent civil litigant. Less than four
million dollars was spent in 1966 to finance the operation of all legal aid organizations in
the United States handling civil cases. This is less than two-tenths of one percent of the
total expenditures for legal services in this country in that same year. Carlin & Howard,
Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REy. 381, 410 (1967).
61. See Brounsky v. Brounsky, 33 App. Div. 2d 1028, 308 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1970).
62. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 455, 330 N.E.2d 53, 67, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 106 (1975)
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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